

SECRET

13 JUL 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)

SUBJECT : Interim Report - Security Support by
Physical Security Division During Near
East Crisis June 1967

REFERENCE : Memo dtd 29 June 67 to C/TC, AC/PhySD,
and C/ISSD from DD/PTOS, Subject:
Post-Mortem Report on Security Support
for the Near East Crisis June 1967

1. At the first indication of a deteriorating situation in the Near East, all available data was collected and reviewed for the purpose of establishing the following information with regard to each Station and Base in the critical area.

a. Physical Characteristics - Location of Agency assets within the [REDACTED] Vaults or Secure Areas, and protective equipment.

b. Personnel - Staff personnel, dependents, and Contract employees.

c. Destruction Facilities - Station and/or Base, and [REDACTED] incinerator and emergency destruction devices of all types.

d. Volume of Classified Material on hand at each location.

e. Estimated time to destroy all file holdings utilizing the existing incineration facilities. The resulting worksheets were used to provide NE and AF Divisions with criteria on which to base a decision with regard to precisely when classified destruction should begin.

SECRET

SECRET

2. During late May 1967 Stations and Bases in the threatened area were directed to begin destruction of classified material and to continue destruction until the volume was reduced to an amount

25X1A

25X1A6a

3. At the outset of the emergency situation members of the Survey Branch were placed on alert travel status with current documentation and inoculation to permit a prompt response anywhere in the critical area should the need arise.

4. A program was established to interview returning evacuees from the crisis area to identify all problems encountered during the entire emergency period for the purpose of determining areas which can be improved. This program is continuing at the present time and the results are, therefore, incomplete. Thus far, the value of pre-existing emergency and evacuation plans including document destruction priorities and adequate incinerator and destruction kits is apparent. Agency developed

25X1A13a

well and at times with very extensive and prolonged use.

5. At the present time data is being compiled (by cable inquiry) with regard to the present status of equipment, the volume of classified material on hand, and the estimated destruction time in order to determine and assess the current security posture at each Station and Base to enable Headquarters to reconstitute classified material and destruction equipment.

SECRET

SECRET

6. Stations and Bases which were completely evacuated due to the severing of diplomatic relations and those which became susceptible to physical and technical penetration due to reduced personnel and/or physical damage will be inspected by Headquarters security personnel. The extent of the security inspection will vary in scope at each location due to circumstances peculiar to the particular location.

7. The physical security responsibility at the Stations and Bases affected by the [REDACTED] war involved equipment and procedures which were in effect before the emergency period began. Since the assessment of the effectiveness of these items is continuing it would be premature and possibly erroneous to make conclusions at this time. A subsequent report will be submitted when the above described interviews, inquiries, and inspections are completed.

25X1A6a

[REDACTED]

Acting Chief
Physical Security Division

25X1A9a

Atts

SECRET